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Abstract
In ordinary situations involving a small part of the universe, Born’s rule
seems to work well for calculating probabilities of observations in quantum
theory. However, there are a number of reasons for believing that it is not
adequate for many cosmological purposes. Here a number of possible general-
izations of Born’s rule are discussed, explaining why they are consistent with
the present statistical support for Born’s rule in ordinary situations but can
help solve various cosmological problems.
Bare quantum theory describes the universe in terms of quantum states, oper-
ators, expectation values, wavefunctions, amplitudes, path integrals, etc. but does
not by itself connect these to observations, so bare quantum theory it not directly
testable. To make comparison with observations, Max Born [1] suggested that the
wavefunction gives probabilities. Later it was proposed that the probabilities are
given by the absolute squares of amplitudes, and these can be taken to be expecta-
tion values of projection operators, so in this paper I shall take the mathematization
of Born’s rule to be the idea that the probabilities of observations are given by the
expectation values of projection operators.
This seems to work well empirically in the small part of the universe in which our
human observations have been carried out. However, there are conceptual reasons for
doubting that Born’s rule applies over the whole universe or that it is even adequate
for explaining the probabilities of our observations from a fundamental theory for
the universe when one takes into account the possibility that our observations could
∗Internet address: profdonpage@gmail.com
1
occur in many places across a vast universe [2, 3, 4, 5]. For example, if there are
two identical copies of an observer who each measure the vertical component of the
spin of an electron, and if the electron measured by one copy of the observer has
spin up and the electron measured by the other copy of the observer has spin down,
and if the observer is uncertain which copy he or she is, the probability of observing
spin up will be between 0 and 1, which is not the result that would be given by
the expectation value of a projection operator that is chosen independently of the
quantum state.
Other observations that at least naively seem difficult to explain by Born’s rule
include our observations that we are humans rather than ants, despite the much
greater number of ants on earth, and our ordered observations that do not seem
consistent with typical Boltzmann brain observations that seem to dominate obser-
vations in many simple models for the universe and for the application of Born’s
rule. As we shall see, modifications of Born’s rule can explain the probabilities of
observations by copies of observers, the fact that we do not observe ourselves to be
ants, and the fact that we apparently do not observe ourselves to be Boltzmann
brains. However, it is not yet known what the correct modifications are, so there
remain many possibilities for probabilities of observations.
Here I shall not give an exhaustive list of possible replacements for Born’s rule
but just describe a few of the basic possibilities. The simplest set of possibilities
seem to be that the probabilities of observations are given by the expectation values
of positive ‘awareness operators’ Aj, one for each observation Oj, that are not pro-
jection operators [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], which I have called Sensible Quantum Mechanics
(SQM) or Mindless Sensationalism (MS). Then if angular brackets denote the ex-
pectation value of an operator in the quantum state of the universe, the probability
of the observation Oj is
P (Oj) = pj/
∑
k
pk, (1)
where the unormalized relative probability of the observation Oj is
pj = 〈Aj〉, (2)
the expectation value of the awareness operator Aj in the quantum state of the
universe. In this paper I shall focus mainly on the SQM framework, but I shall
also consider nonlinear rules for getting from the quantum state to the probabilities
of observations, such as the possibility that each relative probability is a non-unit
power of the expectation value of the corresponding positive operator, pj = 〈Aj〉s
with a positive exponent s 6= 1.
The main open question in the SQM framework in which the probabilities of
observations are the expectation values of positive awareness operators (one corre-
sponding to each observation) is what these awareness operators are. This SQM
framework does not assume that there is a spacetime, so it could be valid even in
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formulations of quantum gravity in which spacetime is not fundamental. However,
if the part of the quantum state that gives the dominant contribution to the expec-
tation values of the awareness operators can lead to the approximation of a effective
spacetime or of a quantum superposition of spacetimes, one idea is that the con-
tribution to the expectation value of an awareness operator from each spacetime in
the superposition is the expectation value of the existence of this spacetime multi-
plied by a sum or integral over the spacetime of a localized projection operator for
each spacetime region. (This assumes that each awareness operator Aj gives a neg-
ligible matrix element between two quantum states corresponding to two different
spacetimes.) For example, if a certain brain state leads to a certain observation,
then one might think that a sum or integral over spacetime regions of the localized
projection operator for that brain state would be its contribution in that spacetime
to the expectation value of the awareness operator and hence to the probability for
that observation. (Of course, many different brain states could contribute to the
probability of the observation even in one region, as well as rotations and boosts of
these brain states, the latter posing a potential problem for getting a finite sum or
integral because of the noncompactness of the Lorentz group.)
If in the spacetime approximation one does assume that each spacetime in a
quantum superposition of spacetimes does contribute to an awareness operator by
approximately the sum or integral over that spacetime of a localized projection
operator, not only does one need to know what these localized projection operators
are, but also what the weights are for the sum or integral over the spacetime. It would
be simplest to take uniform weights, but this seems likely to lead to divergences if
spacetime is infinite or has an unbounded expectation value for its 4-volume.
One might try to regularize this infinity by imposing a finite cutoff on the space-
time and then taking the limit of the normalized probabilities when the cutoff is
taken to infinity. However, projection operators are positive operators, and local-
ized projection operators generically have positive expectation values in nonsingu-
lar quantum states (including the vacuum), so if the universe expands to become
asymptotically empty, the dominant contribution to the expectation values of the
awareness operators will be from these positive expectation values of the localized
projection operators in the asymptotically empty spacetime, which correspond to
Boltzmann brain observations. Therefore, the regularization of a uniformly weighted
integral over spacetime would seem to lead to domination by Boltzmann brain ob-
servations. Surely almost all Boltzmann brain observations would be much more
disordered than ours are, so our ordered observations are almost certainly strong
statistical evidence against this Boltzmann brain domination.
Therefore, to avoid Boltzmann brain domination in the sum or integral of local-
ized projection operators over an asymptotically empty spacetime, it seems necessary
to choose weight factors that give convergent integrals that are not dominated by
the asymptotically empty regions where almost all observations would be by Boltz-
mann brains. For spacetimes with preferred spatial hypersurfaces (e.g., each at some
proper time from a big bang or bounce minimal hypersurface) that each have finite
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3-volume (though perhaps tending to infinity asymptotically with time), one simple
procedure for greatly ameliorating the divergent integrals over spacetime is to divide
the contribution over each of these preferred spatial hypersurfaces by the 3-volume
V , thus taking the contribution at each time (on each preferred spatial hypersur-
face) to be the volume average of the expectation value of the localized projection
operator [11, 12] This will make the contribution of each of the preferred spatial hy-
persurfaces finite, but since this contribution seems likely to go to a constant at late
times if the universe becomes asymptotically empty with an asymptotically constant
specetime density of contributions to Boltzmann brain observations, the sum or in-
tegral over times would diverge if the universe lasts forever. Therefore, I have also
proposed Agnesi weighting [13] to solve this problem, replacing the integral over dt
by an integral over dt/(1+ t2), where t is measured in Planck units along the longest
timelike geodesic from the big bang or from a globally minimum hypersurface of a
bounce. This is admittedly ad hoc, so a more elegant formulation should be found
(see also [14] for a slightly less ad hoc alternative), but at least Agnesi weighting
combined with volume averaging renders the integral over spacetime of the localized
projection operators finite and solves the Boltzmann brain problem.
Another modification that seems to be needed is not directly to use localized
projection operators in the weighted integral over spacetime, but to weight the in-
dividual localized projection operators by intrinsic weight factors that depend on
the efficacy of the corresponding matter configuration (e.g., brain configuration) for
producing the observation. For example, to explain why we observe ourselves to
be humans despite the much greater number of ants on earth, it seems plausible
to postulate that human brains are much more efficient in producing sentient expe-
riences than ants, so that the total probability of human conscious observations is
not far below that of ants to make human observations much less probable. There-
fore, one might postulate that the localized projection operators to human brain
configurations should be given much greater weights than the localized projection
operators to ant brain configurations. Perhaps some part of this weighting factor
should be the complexity of the corresponding brain, since human brains seem to
be much more complex than ant brains, but I am sceptical of the hypothesis that
simply getting high complexity (or high information processing) is by itself suffi-
cient for getting a large weight multiplying the corresponding localized projection
operator for the corresponding awareness operator. But even if we do not know
precisely what it is, surely there is a difference in the efficiency of different matter
configurations, such as different brains or different computers, for producing differ-
ent conscious observations, and these differences should be incorporated as different
weights for the corresponding localized projection operators to be integrated over
spacetime with the further spacetime-dependent weights such as volume averaging
and Agnesi weighting.
Suppose that the expectation value of a given spacetime Sk is Ek and that in this
spacetime the expectation value of the localized projection operator for the matter
configurations corresponding to the observation Oj is njk(x
α) as a function of the
4
spacetime position xα. Suppose further that in this spacetime the weight factor for
the integration over the 4-volume is Wk(x
α) (e.g., Wk(x
α) = 1/[V (1+ t2)]) and that
the intrinsic weight factor for the observation Oj is wj. Then the relative probability
of the observation Oj is
pj = 〈Aj〉 = wj
∑
k
Ek
∫
Sk
√−gd4xWk(xα)njk(xα). (3)
This shows that when we break up the expectation value of the awareness operator
Aj corresponding to the observation Oj into contributions by spacetimes Sk that
each have the expectation value Ek, one gets the intrinsic weight wj of the obser-
vation multiplied by the sum, weighted by Ek, of the integral over each spacetime,
weighted within the spacetime Sk by the location-dependent weight factor Wk(x
α),
of the spatial density njk(x
α) in this spacetime that is given by the expectation
value of the localized projection operator corresponding to the observation. There-
fore, in this spacetime way of proceeding, to get the unnormalized probability pj
of the observation Oj, one needs not only the localized projection operator whose
expectation value gives the expected density in spacetime of the occurrences of the
matter configurations giving rise to the observation, but also the intrinsic weight of
the observation, wj (e.g., the factor that is greater for human observations than for
ant observations), and the weighting Wk(x
α) over the 4-volume of each contribut-
ing spacetime Sk that renders the spacetime integral finite and avoids the potential
Boltzmann brain problem.
This shows that there is a lot of freedom in the modification of Born’s rule for
cosmology, even within the restrictions of Sensible Quantum Mechanics in which
the relative probabilities pj of observations are expectation values of the positive
quantum operators Aj that are the ‘awareness operators’ corresponding to the ob-
servations Oj. There would be even more freedom if one abandoned SQM and
allowed the relative probabilities to be nonlinear in the expectation values 〈Aj〉,
such as these expectation values to a power s that is different from unity, or to be
even more general nonlinear functionals of the quantum state.
One might wonder how this freedom fits with the arguments of Sebens and
Carroll [15, 16] that the Born rule follows from their ESM-QM principle, that the
probabilities an observer assigns to recorded outcomes of measurements should only
depend on the joint density matrix of the observer and the detector. In the example
above, other than the weight factors and the expectation values for the spacetimes
themselves, the relative probability pj of an observation depends only on the expec-
tation values of the localized projection operators in the regions that contribute to
these expectation values, which regions can be considered to be the subsystem of
the observer, whose density matrix thus determines the relative probability of the
observation. However, Sebens and Carroll also make the implicit assumption that
the probability of an observation is the same as the probability of the corresponding
branch of the wavefunction, which puts further restrictions on the probabilities of
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observations beyond my assumption that they depend on the expectation values of
the awereness operators.
One might also wonder how the freedom in the modifications of Born’s rule can
be consistent with the observational evidence in favor of it. First, when one considers
human observations on earth that are confined to an extremely tiny fraction of the
universe, the variation of the weight factor Wk(x
α) with location gives a negligible
effect if this weight factor changes by order unity only over a scale comparable
to that of the universe. Second, for observations of alert humans, the intrinsic
weight factors wj for different observations may well be sufficiently near each other
that these differences are not readily noticed, though they might explain increased
awareness of unusual events such as striking coincidences that tend to capture one’s
attention and plausibly lead to higher probabilities for such conscious observations.
If one goes beyond Sensible Quantum Mechanics, with the linear relation it
gives between the quantum state and the unnormalized relative probabilities pj as
the expectation values 〈Aj〉 of awareness operators, to a nonlinear relation such as
pj = 〈Aj〉s with s 6= 1, one might ask how it can be consistent with observations
to have s significantly different from unity. The key is to remember that pj is
the relative probability of an observation itself, which I am taking to be a sentient
experience, and not the fraction of results recorded one way rather than another by
some unconscious recording device.
For example, suppose some detector records the result of some measurement that
according to Born’s rule has approximately a gaussian distribution (e.g., a binomial
distribution for a large number of measurements) with some standard deviation.
Assuming an idealized faithful coupling to a human brain, suppose that the rela-
tive probability of a conscious observation of the measurement result has a relative
probability pj = 〈Aj〉s. This would again give an approximately gaussian distri-
bution with the same mean, but with a standard deviation s times smaller than
the standard deviation given by the Born rule. Hence for s > 0 and a sufficiently
large number of measurements, the probabilities for the human conscious observa-
tions would be concentrated on the fractions of results of one kind versus another
that would be close to what the Born rule predicts for the fractions with the highest
probabilities, tending to confirm the Born rule for any s not too small. Of course, for
s = 0, which is analogous to counting each branch of the wavefunction equally, the
probabilities for the different observations of the fractions would not be dominated
by what the Born rule gives for the expectation value of the fraction, so s = 0 is
strongly statistically ruled out by observations of fractions different from a uniform
distribution of results.
If the observer is aware not just of the total number of measurement results of
each kind but also of a whole sequence of sub-results, within the single human obser-
vation (e.g., one single sentient experience) there is an awareness of the fluctuations
between the sub-results. If these fluctuations are significantly more than what would
be predicted by Born’s rule, this would give statistical evidence for s < 1, and if they
are significantly less than what Born’s rule would predict, this would be evidence for
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s > 1. An awareness of sub-results whose fluctuations are within the range of what
Born’s rule would predict would give evidence against s being too much smaller
than 1 and also against s being too much larger than 1. However, the precision to
which s could be given would be limited by the number of different sub-results that
one would be consciously aware of at once, say N , and I suspect that the statistical
uncertainty of s would be of the order of 1/N , so with a reasonable limit on the
number of sub-results one can be simultaneously consciously aware of in a single
sentient experience, I doubt that s could be determined by humans to a precision
of even a few percent. Note that it would not help to have some device record the
fluctuations in the sub-results and report them to the conscious observer, since the
peak in the observational relative probabilities pj = 〈Aj〉s for the observations of
the fluctuations recorded by the device would be the same as the peak in the Born
rule distribution of the fluctuations if the transfer of the information is faithful from
the device to the conscious system that gives the contributions to 〈Aj〉.
Thus the observational support for Born’s rule is actually also support for a
nonlinear theory in which the relative probabilities of observations are pj = 〈Aj〉s
for any s that is fairly close to unity. It does not give statistical support for s being
extremely close to unity, though of course s = 1 is the simplest possibility and hence
by Occam’s razor could be assigned a high prior probability of being precisely true,
as I personally generally assume is indeed the case. However, it is worthwhile being
aware that taking s to be precisely unity is just a simple assumption and, apart
from its simplicity, does not seem to have strong observational support. Therefore,
considering the example of s not being exactly unity is a good foil against the
certainty of assumptions that are needed to prove Born’s rule, though considerations
of the possible variation of weight factors such as the intrinsic weight wj of an
observation, and the weight factor Wk(x
α) for the integration over the spacetime Sk,
which I view as much more plausible, also give counterexamples to the assumptions
leading to Born’s rule.
I am grateful for discussions with Sean Carroll and for his hospitality at Caltech,
where this paper was written. He emphasized that my Sensible Quantum Mechanics
framework with the relative probability of the observation Oj being the expectation
value of a positive awareness operator Aj (or the generalization of SQM to pj =
〈Aj〉s) is not Everettian quantum theory, which assumes a particular branching of
the quantum state and probabilities of observation depending on this branching.
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